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PARENTAL TORT LIABILITY
INTRODUCTION

The phrase "parental tort liability" has been variously
used to describe three separate and distinct situations from
which liability arises in the parent-child relationship: (1) the
civil liability of a parent to his child for the parent's torts
against the child; (2) the criminal liability (usually a misdemeanor) of a parent for a child's torts against others, an'd
(3) the civil liability of a parent to compensate a third person
for damages caused by the tort of his child.
The 1965 Wyoming Legislature enacted a statute entitled "Parental Tort Liability" which deals with the situation
last-named above. This statute imposes a maximum liability
of three hundred dollars plus costs upon parents in favor of
a third person whose property is damaged by the willful and
malicious torts of a child between the ages of ten and seventeen. In other words, the statute imposes a limited legal duty
upon parents to answer in damages to those who are harmed
by their failure to discharge their moral duty to control their
children.
The draftsmen of the Wyoming Statute appear to have
borrowed, almost in its entirety, the highly similar statute
of the State of Texas which was amended in 1965. A comparison of these two statutes may be found in the Appendix. In
addition, the Appendix will show that thirty-seven of the fifty
states presently have statutes similar to that of Wyoming.
Wyoming has thus joined the majority of states which have
recognized the need for progressive legislation in this field.
COMMON LAW

At common law the general rule is that parents have
no legal responsibility or liability for the torts of their children.' Children of course are liable for their torts, and parents
for theirs, but in the absence of statute or one of the five situations noted below, neither is liable for the torts of the other.
"Relationship does not alone make a father answerable for
the wrongful acts of his minor child. There must be something
1.

PROSSER, TORTS

§

101 (2d ed. 1955); 39 Am. JuR. Parent and Child § 55
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besides relationship [consanguinity] to connect him with such
acts before he becomes liable."'
There are, however, certain common law doctrines which
impose liability upon parents for their children's torts in
certain specified situations. These doctrines, although often
viewed as exceptions to the general rule, are in reality simply
applications of the law of agency or else hold the parent
liable for his own torts. The doctrines which have developed
have application in the following situations: (1) respondeat
superior, a situation in which the child is the agent of the
parent;3 (2) a situation in which the parent has knowledge
of the child's dangerous propensities but fails to protect
others not having such knowledge ;' (3) the situation in which
the parent entrusts a dangerous instrumentality to the child ;5
(4) the situation in which the parent participated with the
child by consenting to or ratifying the tortious act ;6 (5) and
the situation in which, through the parent's negligence, the
child obtains a dangerous instrumentality, the parent knowing
or being in a position to know that the child is capable of
inflicting injury with it.7 It should be noted, however, that
in the last four situations listed above it is not so much that
the parent is liable for the negligence or willful damage of
the child, but rather that he is liable for his own negligence
which results in the child being enabled or allowed to cause the
harm complained of.8
One form of respondeat superior which has gained acceptance in many jurisdictions is the "family purpose" doctrine which is an application of agency law to impose liability
upon parents for torts committed by their children when
they are sent on elrands of family purpose in the family car.
This doctrine indicates that some courts, because of the common law rule, have gone further to find an agency relationship
in the parent-child area.'
(1942); 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child § 66 (1950).
2. 39 AM. JUR. Parent and Child § 55 (1942).
3. E.g., Hice v. Pullam, 130 Colo. 302, 275 P.2d 193 (1954).
4. E.g., Martin v. Barrett, 120 Cal. App. 2d 625, 261 P.2d 551 (1953).
5. Note, 30 NOTRE DAME LAW. 295 (1955).
6. E.g., Johnston v. Orlando, 131 Cal. App. 2d 705, 281 P.2d 357 (1955).
7. E.g., Ellis v. D'Angelo, 9 Cal. Rep. 457, 253 P.2d 675 (1953).
8. Landers v. Medford, 108 Ga. 525, 133 S.E.2d 403 (1963); Potomac Ins. Co.
v. Torres, 401 P.2d 308 (N.M. 1965).
9. Ligon, Statutory Comment, 40 N.C.L.REv. 619 (1962).
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It should be remembered, however, that without a situation covered by one of these doctrines or by statute the common
law rule remains that parents have no legal liability for the
torts of their children.
Although there is no case law in Wyoming which directly
adopts the common law rule,'" it is reasonable to infer that
in the absence of statute the Wyoming courts would follow
the general rule. This conclusion becomes more obvious when
it is noted that Wyoming does not follow the family purpose
doctrine." It follows, then, that if our courts are reluctant
to impose liability upon parents for the torts of their children
in actions arising from automobile collisions in the absence
of a showing of a clear agency relationship, they would be
equally reluctant to impose liability in other situations without
a similarly clear showing of a comparable relationship.
THE NEW

STATUTE

The Wyoming Legislature changed the coimnon law rule
in part by the enactment of the 1965 Parental Tort Liability
statute. 2 The obvious purpose of the statute is to impose a
limited liability upon parents for the torts of their children
10. The rule was evidently so widely and generally accepted that no one
attempted to challenge it in Wyoming courts.
i1. Sare v. Stetz, 67 Wyo. 55, 214 P.2d 486 (1950); Wyoming Dep't of Revenue
v. Wilson, 400 P.2d 144 (Wyo. 1965).
12. WYo. STAT. § 14-5.1 (Comp. 1965): Parental tort liability-Who may recover; limitation on amount of damages; parents to whom act inapplicableAny property owner, including any municipal corporation, county, school
district, or other political subdivision of the State of Wyoming, or any
department or agency of the State of Wyoming, or any person, partnership,
corporation or association, or any religious organization whether incorporated or unincorporated, shall be entitled to recover damages in an amount
not to exceed three hundred dollars ($300) from the parents of any minor
under the age of seventeen (17) years and over the age of ten (10), who
maliciously and willfully damages or destroys property, real, personal or
mixed, belonging to such owner. However, this act [§§ 14-5.1 to 14-5.3]
shall not apply to parents whose parental custody and control of such
child has been removed by court order, decree or judgment.
WYO. STAT. § 14-5.2 (Comp. 1965): Same-Limitation on amount of recovery. The recovery in such action shall be limited to the actual damages in an
amount not to exceed three hundred dollars ($300), in addition to taxable
court costs.
WYo. STAT. § 14-5.3 (Comp. 1965): Same-Action authorized by act does
not preclude other actions.-The action authorized in this act [§§ 14-5.1 to
14-5.3] shall be in addition to all other actions which the owner is entitled
to maintain and nothing in this act shall preclude recovery in a greater
amount from the minor or from any person, including the parents, for
damages to which such minor or other person would otherwise be liable,
it being the purpose of this act to authorize recovery from parents, and
to limit the amount of recovery, in situations where they would not otherwise be liable.
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in some situations where the general common law rule would
otherwise apply.
The statute begins by reciting those persons who are
eligible to bring an action against the child tort-feasor's
parents. "Any property owner, including any municipal corporation, county, school district . . . or any department or

agency of the State... or any person, partnership, corporation
or association, or any religious organization . . ." are the

enumerated specific types of persons who may sue under the
statute and who would be most likely to need the protection
of the statute. 8 Thus almost everyone who owns property
is covered by the statute.
The significant problem in this area concerns the definition of "owner." There could well be argument concerning
whether or not persons with less than full title interest, such
as lessees, bailees, mortgagees and others are owners within
the meaning of the statute. It can fairly be assumed, however,
that in this area of law, as in others, such persons would be
entitled to maintain an action under the statute. Thus bailees
have been described as having a special property in the subject
matter of the bailment which is the equivalent of actual ownership as against anyone but the bailor." Bailees, then,
are entitled to maintain actions under replevin statutes. 5
Similarly, at common law, possession was viewed as the
equivalent of ownership for purposes of maintaining trespass
for damages to real and personal property, thus allowing
the possessor to recover as against anyone but the one with
better ti.tle.' 6 In addition, mortgagees have been allowed to
recover in replevin 7 and an insurer has been allowed to
recover under a parental liability statute through subrogation. 8 These interests, bailment, possession, and so forth,
carry with them rights similar to ownership. Therefore, it
would appear that persons in such positions should be entitled
WYO. STAT. § 14-5.1 (Comp. 1965).
Eaton v. Schild, 8 N.J. Misc. 245, 149 Atl. 637 (1930).
E.g., Wyo. STAT. § 1-1001(2) (1957).
E.g., Noble & Carmody v. Hudson, 20 Wyo. 227, 122 Pac. 901 (1912) ; Bader
v. Mills & Baker Co., 28 Wyo. 191, 201 Pac. 1012 (1921).
17. Freeman v. Crout, 1 Wyo. 361 (1875); Iba v. Central Ass'n., 5 Wyo. 355,
40 Pac. 527 (1895).
18. General Ins. Co. of America v. Faulkner, 259 N.C. 317, 130 S.E.2d 645
(1963).

13.
14.
15.
16.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol1/iss1/10

4

Aspinwall: Parental Tort Liability

1966

LEGISLATIVE

COMMENTS

to sue for damages under this statute in the proper circumstances.
The statute is clear regarding the property which it is
designed to cover, i.e. "real, personal, or mixed ....,,9 This
means that vandalism to automobiles, homes, camping equipment, land, or virtually any property is actionable provided
that the other requirements are met."0

LIMIT OF LIABIuTY
The $300 plus costs limit of liability is in line with most
of the liability limits of the statutes of other states,21 the
median of the range, with a low of $100 to a no-limit high,
being $300. The basis of 'determination inreaching this figure
is not altogether clear, but this amount is probably adequate
to compensate for the type of destruction which the statute
contemplates.
PERSONS COVERED
The Wyoming statute holds parents liable for the torts
of persons "under the age of seventeen and over the age of
ten...." It may be that more perfect language could have
been chosen for this description, but it seems certain that
children come within the scope of the statute on their tenth
birthday and fall without it on their seventeenth birthday.
Here again it is not clear exactly why these particular limits
were chosen but the reason would appear to be that children
under the age of ten are traditionally viewed as being incapable
of forming the requisite intent,2 and that children above the
age of seventeen are beyond their parents' control. The
median maximum age covered in other states is eighteen
whereas in Wyoming it is seventeen; however, most other
states do not provide for a lower or minimum age as does
Wyoming."
19. See statute 8upra note 12.
20. The reported cases seem largely confined to actions involving homes, schools
and automobiles.
21. See appendix infra p. 308.
22. PRossR, TORTS § 109 (2d ed. 1955); 46 C.J.S. Intentional (1946); Connors
v. Pantano, 165 Neb. 515, 86 N.W.2d 367 (1957) (a child of four years and
and seven months incapable of willful and intentional destruction of property for purposes of statute).
23. See appendix infra p. 308.
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INTENT

Perhaps one of the most important features of the statute
and the one which prevents it from becoming a catch-all for
nuisance or simple negligence claims is the requirement of a
showing of malicious and willful intent. Malicious and willful
intent has been defined generally as an act done in willful
neglect of a known obligation, with reckless 'disregard of the
consequences.2 4 Malicious means simply intentional and willful."' "Acts willfully and designedly done which are unlawful, are malicious in respect to those to whom they are
injurious."' Thus, willful and malicious are synonymous.
Quoting with approval from a Massachusetts case, 2 the
Wyoming Supreme Court has defined malicious and willful
intent as follows: "The injury must not only be willful (that
is, intentional and by design, as distiguished from that which
is thoughtless or accidental), but it must, in addition, be
malicious, in [that it must be done out of a spirit of cruelty,
hostility, or revenge]."' 8
In view of the intent requirement of the statute it is
readily apparent that it is not within the scope of the statute
to hold parents liable for simple negligent acts of their
children." The acts must amount to something more, and the
damage must have been done by the child with full knowledge
of the damage he was causing. By this requirement it is
obvious that most of the "usual" acts of vandalism and
malicious mischief, e.g., slashing tires, smearing paint on
automobiles or houses, will be covered, while acts of common
negligence, e.g., baseballs through windows and bicycles
through flower beds, will not.

WHo

ARE PARENTS I

Parents "whose parental custody and control of such
child has been removed by court order, decree or judgment"
are not within the contemplation of the statute.3 Although
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

United States v. Reed, 86 Fed. 308 (1897).
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
Bourisk v. Derry Lumber Co., 130 Me. 376, 156 AtI. 382, 383 (1931).
Commonwealth v. Williams, 110 Mass. 401 (1872).
State v. Johnson, 7 Wyo. 512, 54 Pac. 502 (1898).
Connors v. Pantano, supra note 22; Potomac Ins. Co. v. Torres, supra note 8.
WYO. STAT. § 14-5.1 (Comp. 1965).
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this seems clear enough, questions may arise as to whether
step-parents, who are not legal or adoptive parents, are liable
under the statute; and whether others standing in loco parentis
are liable for the child's torts. The answers to these questions
are unclear at this point, but the small weight of authority
3
seems to indicate that persons in both categories are liable. '
At least one court, however, has held that whether or not such
"parents" are liable "depends upon the particular facts of
each case.2 Thus, whether the step-parents are legally adoptive parents, the extent of dominion and control exercised
over the child, and the length and permanency of residence
of the child with those sought to be charged are all important
considerations in "determining liability.
In addition to the above questions, there seems to be a
possible controversy over whether liability will fail in any
other situation where the child is not living with the parent,
other than when custody and control have been removed by
court order. One case held that the parent was not liable
when the son was in military service."3 This court also said
there would be no liability when the son was in the custody
of law enforcement authorities.3" To the contrary, however,
still another case held that even though the child "quits the
parental roof" the father was liable if he had not given up
parental authority and control or unless it was suspended,
interrupted or destroyed by operation of law. 5 No safe
sweeping generalization can be made in this area as yet, but
it would appear that if custody and control have been removed
either in law or in fact, parents will no longer be liable.
OTHEm AcTioNs

The statute plainly states that it is not a substitute for
the other actions that may be available to persons sustaining
damage, under any of the five doctrines noted above, but
is in addition to such actions and is designed to allow recovery
in circumstances where the doctrines would not apply. Thus,
31. Xaphes v. Mossey, 224 F. Supp. 578 (1963); Loomis v. State, 39 Cal Rep.
820, 228 Cal. App. 2d 820 (1964).
32. Bricault v. Deveau, 157 A.2d 604 (Conn. 1960).
33. Redd v. Bohannon, 166 So.2d 362 (La. 1964).
34. Ibid. (Dictum).
35. Watkins v. Cupit, 130 So.2d 720 (La. 1961).
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the statute broadens rather than restricts the possibilities of
recovery by a property owner or person for child-caused
damage. In addition to adding one more area of recovery
to the field, it does not eliminate the right of a judgment
creditor to keep his judgment alive through the statutory
process of renewal until that child acquires sufficient assets
to satisfy it. Thus, it is now safe to say that the Wyoming
Legislature has by legislation caused one more chink in the
armor of parental immunity for a child's torts.
CASE LAW

There is a decided paucity of case law in the parental tort
liability field. Most of the cases do not deal with a "direct
application of the particular statute to particular situations,
nor with interpretation of the provisions of the statutes in
question. Those which do exist are concerned primarily with
the issue of constitutionality2 The constitutional argument
is that it is unconstitutional to hold one person liable for the
acts of another, because this violates due process and equal
protection." This contention, however, was disposed of by
the Texas Court of Civil Appeals in Kelly v. Williams8 in
which it was said that the statute gave fair notice of what
was required and that it was neither unreasonable and discriminatory nor a denial of equal protection and due process
to hold a parent liable for the intentional torts of his child.
In the Kelly case a boy of fifteen had stolen the plaintiff's
car and had caused severe damage to it in a high speed chase
with the police. Both the trial and appellate courts allowed
recovery to the statutory limit of $300. The Kelly case was
in turn cited with approval in the 1963 North Carolina case
of General Insurance Company of America v. Faulkner"
which held that an insuror could recover by subrogation from
the parents of an eleven year old child who had set fire to
the insured's school building. The Faulkner case, decided by
the North Carolina Supreme Court, similarly held that the
statute was not violative of due process or equal protection
36. 47 A.B.A.J. 804 (1961).
37. Kelly v. Williams, 346 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
28. Ibid.
39. General Ins. Co. of America v. Faulkner, supra note 18.
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in so holding the parents liable and was, therefore, constitu-

tional.
In the Kelly case the court said:
The Civil Codes of Europe, Central and South
America, Quebec, Louisiana, Hawaii and Puerto
Rico have always provided for parental liability for
the torts of children ....[T]hese legislatures... have
decided that in all fairness, it is better that the
parents of these young tort feasors be required to
compensate those who are damaged, even though the
parents be without fault, rather than to let the loss
fall upon the innocent victim."
This same passage was quoted in the Faulkner case and
the North Carolina Court, in addition, said that it is not
unconstitutional to allow a plaintiff to sue parents under a
statute imposing "vicarious liability upon parents by virtue
of their relationship for the malicious or willful destruction
of property by a child under the age of eighteen living with
them."" Although the United States Supreme Court has not
yet been called upon to decide the constitutional question of
such statutes, in view of present public opinion and policy it
is expected that the statutes would not be found constitutionally objectionable by it.
In view of the recent enactments of most of the parental
tort liability statutes and of the decidely few actions which
have been brought under them, it is too early to tell whether
or not such statutes will have the desired effect of increasing
parental responsibility and control, and reducing juvenile
delinquency.4" Opinions have been ventured on both sides. A
majority of the state legislatures, however, have evidently
been impressed with the possibility that such statutes will
accomplish this result.'3
CTARLES S. ASPINWALL

40. Kelly v. Williams, supra note 37 at 437, quoting from 3 VILL. L. REV. 529,
531 (1958).
41. General Ins. Co. of America v. Faulkner, supra note 18 at 652.
42. Freer, Parental Liability for Torts of Children, 53 KY. L.J. 254 (1964-1965).
43. Ibid.
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Appendlix*
PARENTAL LIABILITY LEGISLATION

MAXIMUM
STATE CODE CITATION

ALASKA STAT. § 34.50.020 (1962)1
ARMz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-661 (1956)1''
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-109 (Supp. 1965)'
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.1' 84
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-7 (1963)'
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572 (Supp. 1963)1,,'
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3923 (Supp. 1964)'
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 45.20 (1963)'
GA. CODE ANN. § 105-113 (1956) 1 8'
HAWAII REV. LAws § 830-3 (1955)1 •
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-210 (Supp. 1965)'
IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-520 (Supp. 1965)84
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-120 (Supp. 1965)'
LA. CIv. CODE art. 2318 (West 1961)1"
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 217 (1965)1 "
MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 76(i) (Supp. 1965)'
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2913 (1962)1"
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 61-112.1, 2 (1947)'
NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-801 (1943)'
NEV. REv. STAT. § 41.470 (1957) "
N.J. REV. STAT. § 18:14-51 (1937)5
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-8-53.1 (Supp. 1965)'
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-538.1 (Supp. 1965)'
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-39 (1960)''
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10 (1962)'
ORE. REV. STAT. § 30.770 (1965)8
R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 9-1-3 (1956)1 4
S.D. CODE § 14.0309-1 (Supp. 1960)'
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1001, 1002 (Supp. 1965)'
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 5923-1 (Supp. 1965)' &8
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 901 (Supp. 1965)"'
VA. CODE ANN. § 8-654.1 (Supp. 1964)1
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.190 (1962)''
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5482.2, 3 (1961) '
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 331.035 (1963)'
WYo. STAT. § 14-5.1 to .3 (Comp. 1965)'

YEARt

LIABILITY

1957 $ 500
1956
500
1959
300
1955, 1965
500
1959
300
1955, 1959
750
1958
300
1956
300
1956 Open
1859 Open
1957
300
1957
500
1959, 1965 1,000
1952 Open

AGE

18
Minor
18
Minor
18
Minor
18
18
17
Minor
18
18
18
Minor

1959

250

7-17

1959
1953, 1962
1957
1951
1957
1903
1953, 1965
1961
1957
1957
1959
1956
1957
1957
1957, 1965
1959
1960
1961
1957
1957
1965

500
500
300
Open
300
Open
500
500
300
800

Minor
18
18
Minor
18
Pupil
18
18
18
18
18
Minor
18
18
10-18
17
18
18
18
Minor
10-17

300
250
300
300
5,000
250
200
300
300
300
300

• All such legislation as author's research disclosed. Similar other legislation
may exist under different index titles.
t The first date listed is the year the original act was enacted; subsequent dates
indicate the latest significant amendment.
1. Includes personal injury liability.
2. Includes motor vehicle liability.
3. In addition to any other civil liability.
4. Property liability only.
5. School vandalism only-by pupil.
6. Public property only.
7. Due care and diligence of parent or guardian is a bar to recovery.
8. Probably Wyoming's statute of origin.
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